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The nation-state as defined by Dr. Kalevj Holsti is a combination of traditions, territories, and a recognized government that retains the loyalty of its people is fundamental to understanding the intrinsic power of the state, independent of any potential ability to coerce either internally or externally. A military that can ensure its survival is a key component to ensure a state retains the loyalty of its citizens. This foundation for understanding what the state is, lends to the past and future implications of the Peace of Westphalia and its effect on the sovereignty of states.
The term Westphalia and its meaning and framework are often not well defined, or similar to Clausewitz in military discussions it is often quoted, but seldom specifically defined. Many very respected and popular international relations theorists have in recent years speculated on the death of the Westphalia construct given globalization and the apparent rise in power of the non-state actor. These theorists like Thomas Barnett, Thomas Friedman, and Samuel Huntington provide various lenses through which to explore the validity of the Westphalia model and its constructive use in the future. Inseparable in this argument are the effects of a COIN centric force that is currently decisively engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan and its ability to react to future conventional threats.
Lastly, achieving an understanding of what Westphalia is lends to the appropriate training, manning and equipping of a nation-states military, as Westphalia essentially ended the rein of state-sponsored mercenary armies in 1648. The argument being that if Westphalia is alive and well, and that the forces of globalization and non-state actors have not eroded the boundaries of modern states, then a conventional capable military force will be necessary and desired for the foreseeable future.
iii Most watershed events in history are well known and apparent to many with little explanation. American grade school children commit to memory dates like; 1492; July 4 th 1776; and December 7 th , 1941 for their obvious associations to dramatic events. Other dates are not so well remembered but the events that transpired can have dramatic, if not well understood, effects on the individuals, organizations, and even the superpower involved. 1648 is a little known, and even less understood date that continues to have a profound impact in the world today as it marks the signing of the Peace of Westphalia.
The Peace of Westphalia, comprised of the two treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, brought to an end the Thirty Years War an especially vicious period of warfare in world history which had resulted in over two million battle deaths and was noted for its wanton brutality against civil populations. 2 In the period leading up to the signing of the treaties, mercenary armies were hired out by dynastic elements (not confined to only kings or city states but included also then international actors like the Catholic Church) to conduct it's wars and other martial policy to achieve their desired objectives. Often the objectives centered on enforcing or protecting the religion of a particular country or a territorial claim long in dispute. This led to armies of relatively diverse composition and even more dubious loyalty that were often not regularly paid or fed when fielded an opposing force. This would often spell calamity for any neighboring towns or villag that the soldiers would often pillage for food and other spoils in order to survive and made being a mercenary profitable. War in this period often spilled across national borders and across ethnic compositions of a population given the religious nature of much of the conflict, bringing widespread death, disease, and pestilence. The Peace of Westphalia ended the carnage and set the framework for modern state sovereignty and is often argued as the foundation for how nation-state actors dialogue and form policy, until some experts say, globalization and the rise of the ability of non-state actors to influence policy and achieve results without the framework of a state.
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Somalia and System Shock
The date of 3 October 1993 will not be remembered as well as the actual events and images that took place on that hot, awful day in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which a small contingent of American Army Rangers and Delta Force Operatives undertook an operation to detain two of clan lord Farrah Aidid's lieutenants. 3 The battle that ensued from that action would leave nineteen American soldiers dead, four advanced MH-60
Blackhawk helicopters destroyed, and one pilot captured by Somali clan lords. 4 America would be horrified by the images of American dead being abused on the streets of Mogadishu, and would ultimately honor two of the fallen, MSG Gary Gordan and SFC 3 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, (New York, Penguin Books 2000), 1.
4 Bowden, Black Hawk Down, [331] [332] [333] Randy Shughart with its highest award for valor, the Medal of Honor. Although the battle would leave an estimated 2,000 Somalis dead or wounded, 3 October would become a holiday for the rulers and clans of Somalia in which they withstood the onslaught of the world's only superpower, forcing the US to withdrawal from the country just months later. 5 Ordinary citizens in America and soldiers would wonder why the US was there, how could America's finest military personnel be caught so short against an abysmally trained and equipped guerilla force or so seemingly squandered by an American administration. It marked a dangerous precedent on the world stage that showed the limits of American resolve when its finest men and women would be sacrificed in actions that have unclear ties to American national security. It represented a shock to the system of a superbly trained, manned, and equipped force that seemed without peer in the early 1990's; and only through success in Balkan peace keeping and political amnesia by the Clinton administration would the events of 3 October be ignored
and not soon remembered. (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996) 28-29. a conventionally focused military designed to protect those principles seems to be increasingly anachronistic in a globalized, interdependent world.
A System in Struggle for Identity
The importance in discussing these "dates" at the introduction of this work is that they serve as useful representations of the central element of struggle in today's Army seem unwinnable. The speed of information, the potential administration change every four years in Washington, and the small (but not cheap) all volunteer force that is the best the world has seen makes the employment and readiness of the US military a key consideration in ensuring the protection of the United States and its sovereignty. Nonstate actors make this an even more complicated issue as it clouds the responsibility of how and with what a nation state should use to respond to nontraditional security threats.
Together these issues comprise the tension that is felt today in the military with globalization, the threat of non-state actors, and their ultimate implication for the survival of the Westphalia system.
Globalization and the rise of powerful non-state actors could seemingly have brought the death blow to both the Westphalia nation-state system and conventional warfare for decades to come, raising serious concerns for national security policy of the US and the composition, training and ability of the future US military. This struggle or crisis of identity for the Army has only become worse as combat in Iraq and Afghanistan concurrently have stretched into its fifth year. If an army can be considered the identity of a nation, a summation of its values and the total experience of the soldiers and leaders that make up its ranks; then those same soldiers that participated in the opening phase of Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) reaped the benefits of the years of training and cost of creating a force par excellence in conventional operations. Company-grade officers, that were the company and troop commanders during the high-intensity phase that would shortly either continue with winning the peace or move on to professional education, and would not question the mistakes that led to the insurgency, but would question why the American people and its administration would squander the conventional ability and experience of its military. It is also these leaders and soldiers that understand that it is nearly impossible to have a unit trained for conventional operations and expect them not to encounter difficulties in transitioning to stability operations without the ability to stand-down and retrain/equip for that mission. It is a completely different mind and skill set that is not quickly transitioned to or from, within US combat units. Ultimately this paper is not setting out to refute the lessons of counter-insurgency warfare, but rather to exalt in the conventional capability of its military; and that for every continued rotation in Iraq gives a chance for parity with peer competitors.
Purpose
The purpose of this monograph is to discuss the validity of the argument that the continued connectedness of the global community and the rise of the non-state actor together equal the death of the Westphalia State-System that has been the norm since established in 1648. As an army is entrusted with the protection and survival of a nation; the Westphalia model shows why it is American soldiers and not Blackwater security that patrols the streets of Baghdad with new Iraq Police and Army Units. This is central to the argument and its implications for the future of the US military in its potential employment, development, and training; as a force currently configured for large scale conventional confrontations that differs dramatically from a force designed to maintain security and conduct nation-building operations. Holsti makes the argument that in order to be considered a legitimate state, three conditions must be meet: 1) the idea of the state (traditions, history, culture); 2) the physical basis of the state (territory); 3) institutional expression of the state (internal and externally recognized, functioning government). 12 The common meaning of a sovereign state is one of the most broadly defined with much implicit understanding but no commonly agreed to terminology in political science. Something that adds strength to the construct that Dr. Holsti uses is its ability to be used separate from the military power of the state. Power, war and the ability of a nation to maintain its sovereignty invariably creep into the definition of a nation-state; however Holsti's construct relies more on a state's ability to maintain loyalty from its citizens rather than their relative power which is a more useful definition in codifying what a nation-state is verse what it does or has the ability to do. This is an important distinction to make as it supports the notion of the Westphalia principle of equality among states that will be addressed shortly. This model also works well in identifying those factors that often led to the failure of a state independent of their economic or military power; losing the ability of the nation to retain the loyalty of its constituents. Russia in 1917 had alienated a populace with constant warfare, leading to their inability to maintain the third criteria of institutional (government) expression. Somalia in the 1990's also showed this same fault, eventually falling into deeper chaos with no clear government control. Other non-state entities lack at least one of the conditions that allow a successful state to be formed and maintained.
The Kurds in Northern Iraq lack both territory, and an institution; Palestine is obviously 12 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, [82] [83] [84] lacking the territorial control preventing statehood, however close it maybe to this condition being changed. The ability of the model to separate economic and military horse power from defining a state will be essential in refuting much of the critic of Westphalia Model of international relations. By measuring states by their idea and traditions, territory, and its institutions and removing either the economic or military power of a state, the discussion of the sovereignty of a state can be more objectively discussed.
Peace of Westphalia Defined
In comparison to defining the state, the term Westphalia and its meaning is difficult to define with precision, but also highly controversial in its relevance in today's contemporary operating environment. In terms of defining the "Westphalia System" would lead nations to the belief of creating and maintaining a national army. 14 The scourge of mercenary armies roaming the continent at will, loosely controlled by their benefactor often pillaging cities to feed the soldiers, livestock and camp-followers that habitually followed the fielded army, bringing fear and pestilence invariably to any village or town they happened across would not be tolerated again by the nation states involved in the war. Although all three elements described above have a definitive impact on the world today, it is a mistake to believe that their combined effects will be the demise of the power of the sovereign state and its ability to project its will on the world stage. Theories abound for how this will occur and below follows a discussion that explores alternative world views of how the future will potentially change given globalization, non-state actors, and the rebirth of COIN in military doctrine. Thomas Barnett, Samuel
Huntington, and others to be discussed saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as a pivotal "date" in world politics that offered a unique opportunity to change the landscape of the world for the good of all man-kind. However, all see the nation-state as becoming less important to some other element of international decision making, all however differ widely in what that element will be.
Thomas Barnett and The Pentagon's New Map
Recently, one of the most popular future forecasters of world military and political evolution has been Dr. 35 Despite political and economic globalization and continuous nonstate actor threats, Rome was able to maintain its sovereignty for over 500 years.
Samuel Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations
Another popular future theorist who also provides more of an adaption of the but its views and policies will be clearly shaped by a cultural lens that will only become more focused as other cultures begin to act against the US's self interest. 
The Cold War and the End of An Era
The end of the Cold War, like so many other times in history, seemed to mark an end to a dark chapter in human history that could soon be followed by a peaceful 37 Huntington, it at the turn of the century with growing international commerce. 38 And again, like other times in history it has shown to be false. This is not to be a pessimist about the future state of man, it is just is a reality check proving an old Roman axiom that has held true;
"that if a nation truly wants peace, it should prepare for war."
John Mearsheimer and the Tragedy of Great Power Politics
What is the point of all this analysis and refuting of future world models? What (New York, Norton, 2003), 34. in globalism because it is usually beneficial to their economic self-interest; nations will support various ideologies (religious or political) if it is beneficial in unifying large population groups of their society. In the future world vision; economy is important of course, culture norms and values shape national perspective; but at the core, there will be an internal and externally recognized nation-state that shapes the policy for its own selfinterests and objectives. To validate this, one has to look no farther than the history of US foreign policy to see that core policies have continually adapted and changed to meet it's growing power and changing world environment. 40 At the birth of the nation, President Washington was a strict unilateralist; believing strongly that any entanglement with foreign treaties or alliances would ultimately led to the US under the yolk of some imperial power, be it Britain, France, or other dominant European power; even if it meant watching the death of other democracy from the sidelines. This tradition has obviously changed drastically today as the US begins its policy of Global Meliorism where the US has taken on the mission of making the world a better place, often becoming "entangled" 42 Stephen Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Winter, 1995 pp. 115-151.
Non-state actors dealt with in the past, Native Americans (granted that they were treated as individual "nations") and Barbary Pirates were some of the first non-state actors that the new and fragile American government would have to contend with. 43 Today, international corporations can have profound influence across numerous borders with their ability to influence the economy of the numerous nations. A contemporary example being the French trader Jerome Kerviel who cost one of the central banks of France, the Societe Generale over 7.2 billion dollars that had to be recovered, but still did not threaten the sovereignty of the nation. 44 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and even today's simple, small arms make the threat of non-state actor actions and influence very real, but it is not a new threat. Powerful non-state actors have, and will continue to wax and wane in influence in the world and they are an important security concern; however they will not create the demise of the nation-state or the need for a conventionally focused army. How this concerns the employment and training of military forces is important and will be covered next; and in this essential connection it has to be clear that the continued relevancy and power of the Westphalia state system has a direct effect on that nation's military force. The dynamics of this not being the case would certainly reverse the course of history to before the completion of the Peace of Westphalia and facilitate the rise again of mercenary armies. So far, this has not been the case.
43 McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, 26, 33. 44 BusinessWeek, Societe Generale, (McGraw-Hill, Feburary 25, 2008) 21.
THE US MILITARY CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Terminology coming from the current US administration, military commanders, warfare (Conventional and COIN) ; an example would be engaging targets with individual weapon systems of which soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan get plenty of exposure and training both in practice and unfortunately in operating in those environments. However, there are many essential METL elements that are not trained to what would be considered appropriate to win high-intensity conventional operations; examples being utilizing indirect fire to maneuver against a defending enemy, or commanding and controlling a conventional force while maneuvering on the battlefield. This condition is necessary because 1) the military has to adapt to the enemy it is currently fighting, something that has been done continually in the modern age and 2) the current US National Command Authority has assumed risk that any conventional threat that might arise can be decisively dealt with using the current technologically superior US Air Force and Navy. Ability" and an all-volunteer military will be needlessly wasted until it is retrained for the new operating environment. This tension in the organization is intensified by three unique characteristics of a national military force. The first is that the Army is tasked with winning the nation's wars, leading to the second characteristic in that the consequences for failure in a conventional confrontation is usually very high for a nation, potentially its very survival. The third is that recognizing a short-coming is like turning a big ship, it isn't quick and a nation can quickly find itself behind peer competitors if is not fully aware of global trends and movements; with an innovative military capable of turning and adapting quicker than those that are not. 54 As seen below, with total military capability of the US is slowly adapting to the requirement for increased stability operations, but off-set by off convention skill sets, destruction and damage of key weapon systems and the delaying or canceling of new weapon systems, it is easy to see how potential peer competitors will gain parity if not superiority over conventional US forces in the foreseeable future. The question of the connection between the future of US force structure and the Westphalia Model is in relation to current and projected threats. Given the validity of the Westphalia system on future world politics; the premise that nations remain sovereign to themselves, entering and exiting treaties and strategies as necessary in accordance with their own self-interest, it is extremely likely that a conventional war is not likely in the next five to ten years, but surely sooner than most policy makers think. Given this, with the current focus on COIN and the cost of sustaining the force in Iraq, will the US be ready to successfully wage a conventional war against a near competitor? Not the subject 56 Military trend line developed by the author as a mental framework for changing the structure and doctrine of a military force; taking time to react by retraining new soldiers and fielding new equipment, after being degraded by five years of deployment and conflict. of this paper is the rightness or justification of the US in going to war in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but what is the subject is the cost and policy of sustaining a US force capable of defeating future threats. A focus on COIN Operations is not the nail in the coffin for the current US military; on the contrary what has shown to be historically true is that the US military has to be capable of acting across the spectrum of war decisively and often simultaneously. But Westphalia shows us is that with globalization, growing peer competitors, and competition for economic partners, a solid conventional force will also be required to ensure the access of America to world markets that are key in sustaining many of the world's connected economies.
RECOMMENDATION
What is the implication of all this apparent pessimism of the future ability of mankind to peaceably coexist? Specifically for the US and its national security strategy it does not mean it should forget all the hard-learned COIN doctrine that is coming into place in current Army doctrine. As was brought out earlier in this analysis, America has to win the current war. But this does not absolve the administration or the military of preparing for the future. However, statements proclaiming the conventional superiority of the US with the assumption that its ability would preclude any conventional challenger are both dangerous and short-sighted, especially given the current erosion of traditional conventional experiences. Examples in the past of this mistake include the opening months of the Korean conflict with Task Force Smith, the wholly undermanned and tragically underequipped force that could do little to stop a North Korean onslaught and Israel's belief that Egypt could not overcome the technical and tactical ability of the IDF; only to be surprised and suffer grievous losses to Soviet supplied AT-3 Sagger anti-tank missiles, and SA-2 surface to air missiles. 57 Current ongoing operations have left the United States with a small strategic reserve and with an army that is currently (using terms from figure one) a stability focused army. 58 The issue with this situation is the ability of the Army to perform its primary mission which is to fight and win this nation's wars. As GEN Douglas MacArthur so eloquently put it in his farewell address to the concern with the installment of an NATO missile shield inside their former realm of influence, China's growing need for energy and subsequent presence in Africa; the still as yet unresolved Indian-Pakistan conflict are all areas of concern where a well manned and equipped conventional force will give the US policy makers the latitude and capability desired to achieve their national objectives. Russia, China, and even Iran have showed the ability to produce weapon systems that appear to be challenges to the best the current US military has to offer. Clearly non-state actors have been and will continue to be a concern and something that often has to be dealt with; but should not be at the cost of US conventional capability. This will diminish not only the military options of the US, but all elements of national power.
The way ahead in twenty-first century warfare will mean leveraging counterinsurgency warfare into a conventionally ready force. Now is not the time to hold the current conventional/technological gap that the US enjoys, but expand it as far as possible to stay in front of all potential peer competitor capabilities. Although the international environment is unusually benign in terms of conventional, nation-state confrontations, as highlighted in Army Posture Statement the US should as quickly as possible reconstitute its former conventional capability. 60 This would have to be done by either expanding the size of the force, or reducing its present global footprint. This again is not to say that the US military should disregard the necessity for stability operations, or the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, but it should always retain the ability to conduct decisive, conventional operations. Policy makers have to understand that the ability, coupled with 60 U.S. Congress. Senate and House. 2008 Army Posture Statement t, 6. the current size of the US military gives it the ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of warfare, but not with dual center-mass capabilities in conventional and stability operations. The army at its current size can absolutely do both, but not at the same time. During World War Two, a US M-4 Sherman had to close within 800 meters of the heavier armored, better equipped German Panzer IV or Panther tank, while they could destroy the Sherman vehicles at over 2000 meters. 61 Given the small size, and allvolunteer nature of America's current military force, this situation should absolutely not be tolerated from occurring in the future. The US has far too much technological superiority and industrial might to accept parity from peer competitors. The US, its army, and without question the soldiers and leaders that make up its force are without question worth the price of maintaining this force.
To summarize the recommendations given the continued existence of the Westphalia-system of nation-state's, military and political policy makers should: 1)
Understand that globalization does not currently replace nationalism or other ideologies that potentially lead to conflict and the requisite security needs and concerns; 2) Nonstate actors do not replace the necessity to have a conventionally focused military, and likewise having a conventionally superior military will not negate the need to deal with non-state actors; and 3) The US military needs to regenerate its conventional capability by either growing the force or shrinking (or winning) its current global commitments.
This balanced look into the future is the best way to ensure that the US retains the military to best meet the always unforeseen needs of future combatants.
61 Kenneth Macksey, Tank versus Tank, (London, Grub Street, 1999) , 102.
CONCLUSION
Many of the scholars referenced in this paper and current serving military leaders and soldiers will think this analysis looks like an aging dinosaur, out of touch with current operations and most likely potentialities for near-term conflict. But, for a successful military force that did not have to send a large portion of its soldiers home in metal coffins at the start of hostilities in Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom the focus on conventional capability seems justified and appropriate. Given that this same force has the collective experience of stability operational success in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, not to mention the current operational success in Iraq and Afghanistan, the flexibility of a conventionally trained and manned force appears to be beyond question. Although, the belief that it is best to be trained for lethal operations, and then execute nonlethal operations is too simplistic and does not capture the challenges of conducting stability operations, it does however capture the beliefs of many in the military. This summarizes the current tension that is felt in the military, the "out-balance" idea brought out in the Army's Posture Statement. As an
Army that tends to be disciples of Clausewitz and his often quoted principle that war is a "continuation of policy by other means", it understands that it cannot always pick the battles that the nation requires it to fight. 62 But it also has the duty to prepare for future 62 Clausewitz, Carl von. wars and a duty to care for sons and daughters of America that voluntarily serve in its ranks.
Globalization, both wanted and necessary for a prosperous world order, will not unfortunately replace nationalism, or the end of war. Westphalia, the principle of state sovereignty is as strong as it ever was, even with an ever-more connected world. A nonstate actor's ability to influence the population is not new, and will likely not change.
What has changed is their access to growing levels of technology, means of manipulating the media, and weapons of mass destruction that give these actors an unprecedented ability to kill innocent citizens, but still does not give them the ability to replace the sovereignty of Westphalia state structure. So, globalization and non-state actors influence will continue, but so will the sovereignty of nation states, with nationalism and various other ideologies remaining a dominate value and belief system for the foreseeable future on the world stage; requiring the US military to always be ready to conduct decisive, conventional warfare.
